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Abstract 
 The investigation of subjective experiences (SEs) of space and time is at the core of consciousness research.  The 
term ‘space’ includes the subject and objects.  The SE of subject, I-ness, is defined as ‘Self’.  The SEs of objects, subject’s 
external body, and subject’s internal states such as feelings, thoughts, and so on can be investigated using the proto-
experience (PE)-SE framework.  The SE of time is defined as ‘phenomenal time’ (which includes past, present and 
future) and the SE of space as ‘phenomenal space’. The three non-experiential materialistic models are as follows: (I) 
The quantum-dissipation model [(25)] can connect the discrete neural signals to classical electromagnetic field to 
‘quantum field theory and chaos theory’ for explaining memory. (II) The soliton-catalytic model [(8)] hypothesizes that 
all living processes including micro- and macro-processes can be explained by catalysis process. (III) The ‘sensation 
from evolution of action’ model [(13)] proposes that SEs are internalized during evolution. All these models can 
address to some extent the function of structures, such as perception.  They cannot address explanatory gap. The 
complementary experiential PE-SE framework [(37)] addresses this psycho-physical gap and elucidates the SEs of 
space and time.  
 
 
Key words: Proto-experiences; subjective experiences; consciousness; Self; phenomenal time; phenomenal space; 
quantum-dissipation model; quantum field theory; chaos theory; memory; soliton-catalytic model; sensation from evolution of 
action model; PE-SE framework. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
In subjective experiences (SEs) of space and time, space includes the subject and objects.  The SE 
of subject, I-ness, is called ‘Self’; this is partly elaborated in (3).  The SEs of objects, subject’s 
external body, and subject’s internal states such as feelings, thoughts, and so on can be 
investigated using the PE-SE framework (37).2  An overview of consciousness and the structure of 
matter based on PE-SE framework is given in (19).  We can have SEs or first person experiences 
(1Es) of time, external space (subject and objects), and internal entities (emotions and thoughts).  
The SE of time is called phenomenal time (which includes past, present and future) and the SE of 
space is phenomenal space. We need time to bind all spatially disparate information. This time 
duration can be called ‘duration of present or NOW’, in which spatial-entanglement is involved.  
Phenomenal time is elaborated in (42). 
 
In this mini review article, my goal is (i) to compare the three non-experiential materialistic 
models: quantum-dissipation model (25), soliton-catalytic model (8), and ‘sensation from 
evolution of action’ model (13), and (ii) to elaborate the need for the complementary experiential 
PE-SE framework (37) for elucidating the SEs of space and time and integrating various views.  
 
 
2. Quantum-dissipation model vs. soliton-catalytic model  
 
The quantum-dissipation model connects the discrete neural signals (DNS) to classical 
electromagnetic field (EMF) using quantum field theory (QFT)3 and chaos theory, for example 
DNS↔EMF↔QFT model for memory (9, 24, 25, 45-47). This is useful in the investigation of Self 
and phenomenal time (concisely described later).  
 In this model, “Water and other biochemical molecules entering brain activity are, indeed, all 
characterized by a specific electric dipole which strongly constrains their chemical and physical 
behavior” (25).  The electric dipole field can be considered as the fundamental units of the brain 
rather than neurons (29). However, one could argue that both are related via neuronal-firing and 
other electrochemical activities of neurons and astroglia.  In other words, classical 
electromagnetic field (EMF) arises from the electrochemical activity of discrete neural signals 
(DNS). The coupling between the classical electrochemical level and the quantum dynamical 
level (QFT) is analogous to the coupling between classical acoustic waves and phonons in 
crystals. Intrinsic features of the dissipative quantum model are as follows: (i) brain processes are 
intrinsically and inextricably dependent on the quantum noise4 in the fluctuating random force in 
                                                     
 
2 PE-SE framework postulates that all types of irreducible fundamental SEs (quality of sensations) and/or proto-
experiences (PEs) are superimposed in strings or elementary entities (fermions and bosons). These elementary entities 
are therefore non-specific to a specific SE and behave as non-experiential material entities. If this type of superposition 
is correct, then co-evolution and co-development can produce neural-nets where SEs can emerge. Thus, the PE-SE 
framework is complementary to all reductive models. Further details are given in [37]. 
 
3 QFT is quantum field theory of electromagnetic field induced during neuronal firing and signal transmission in 
neurons. Therefore, although there is no experimental evidence of Orch OR (orchestrated objective reduction) in a 
neuron, quantum mechanics can still be applied via QFT. 
  
4 Noise (i) may prevent capture by collapse into some unwanted state (attractor), (ii) may provide protection against 
unwanted perturbations (including thermalization) and contributes to the stability of the memory state, and (iii) may 
lead to the emergence of novel entity. 
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the brain-environment coupling, (ii) the chaotic behavior of the trajectories in the space of 
memory states. In the dissipative model, the ‘brain (ground) state’ may be represented as the 
superposition of the full set of memory states; therefore, previously recorded/‘printed’ 
information is not destroyed during current recording. In the non-dissipative model the number 
of freedom is missing and consecutive information ‘printing’ produces ‘overprinting’ (25). 
Dipole-rotation- and time-reversal symmetry breaking is equivalent to the recording of 
information in memory in quantum-dissipation model (25); this meaning of symmetry is different 
from the shape-symmetry in terms of uniform diameter and structure of microtubules for 
generating soliton/traveling-wave (8).   
Dissipative system for avoiding overprinting of new information for new memory in terms of 
superposition in quantum-dissipation model (25) is different from the traveling wave being non-
dissipative for robust recording in microtubules (8).   
The hypothesis is that “the soliton ‘induces’ a coherent state in the microtubule and that any 
catalytic events are due to this change of phase. Furthermore, solitons are non-dissipative in non-
dissipative media. However, the brain is considered an excitable medium. Traveling waves in 
these media are inevitably dissipative. In the soliton-catalytic model (8), energy is dissipated via 
structure (fixed points that do not change under transformation)” (Davia, personal 
correspondence on December 3, 2007).  
Thus the soliton-catalytic model of (8) does not contradict the quantum-dissipative 
DNS↔EMF↔QFT model (25), rather they are equivalent to each other. 
 
 
3. Sensation from evolution of action (Humphrey’s framework) vs. 
soliton-catalytic model 
 
We need to distinguish perception from sensation.  According to Humphrey (12, 13), (i) when we 
see a red rose, we perceive the external presence of a rose of red color (perception) and we also 
have subjective experience of redness (sensation); (ii) sensation helps keeping perception honest: 
“Sensation lends a here-ness and a now-ness and a me-ness to the experience of the world, of 
which pure perception in the absence of sensation is bereft”; (iii) sensory quality is largely 
internal, covert and private; it appeared only after natural selection shaped it; (iv) “In the past my 
ancestors evolved to feel red this way because feeling it this way gave them a real biological 
advantage”; (v) ‘self-representations arise through action, and that the “feeling self” may actually 
be created by those very sensory activities that make up its experience.’; and (vi) the quality of 
sensations (or SEs), though private today, has been shaped by natural selection in the past as a 
result of evolution: the primitive activity of sensing slowly became privatized from the overt 
public behavior and transformed into internal mental activity. The soliton-catalytic model (8) 
may be consistent with idea that sensation is the result of internalization of action via evolution 
and natural selection using the traveling wave. For example, when red light fell on the skin of 
primitive amoeba-like animal (floating in the ancient sea), it detected it and made a characteristic 
wriggle of activity (it wriggled ‘redly’) (13). This wriggle can be considered as due to traveling 
wave of soliton-catalytic model, which when got internalized during evolution might have led to 
SE redness in humans.  However, the explanatory gap remains in Humphrey’s framework unless 
the PE-SE framework is invoked in the process of privatization.  
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4. PE-SE framework 
 
The above models can be called ‘non-experiential materialistic’ model because subjective 
experiences (SEs) are assumed to be the emergent property of network or field, and hence has 
explanatory gap. Perception may be explained to some extent by DNS↔EMF↔QFT model and 
soliton-catalytic model; Humphrey’s model can address how sensation evolved from action. 
However, to address the explanatory gap (how SEs can emerge in neural-nets), we need PE-SE 
framework (37), which is a complementary to all non-experiential materialistic models because it 
allows experiential entities such as SE of subject, SE of objects, and SE of time into ‘non-
experiential materialistic’ models. Details are given in (3, 19, 37, 38, 41). 
 
 
5.  Self 
 
Temporal-entanglement is needed for the continuity of Self (3). Self is invariant with time as Self 
is preserved until death, although it is interrupted during sleep, anesthesia, and when subject is 
unconscious.  The invariance of the dynamics of Self requires assigning a conserved entity over 
time. This time-invariant entity could be long-range spatiotemporal correlations that is like 
collective modes, such as Nambu-Goldstone (NG) boson modes in quantum field theory, which 
are wave-like and generated dynamically (25). In soliton-model of (8), the emergent of Self may 
also include extra-neural interaction of the soliton/traveling-wave (energy) carrying self-related 
information with self-related structures (21, 22). In PE-SE framework (37), Self is the SE of subject 
or I-ness. 
 
 
6.  Phenomenal time  
 
The phenomenal time could be considered as reciprocal of critical flicker fusion frequency (i.e., 
1/CFF), which is consistent with the ‘psychological present’: ‘there is always an experienced 
duration in which experience does not change’ (28, 31). 
Once the of electrical-dipole-rotational-symmetry and time-reversal symmetry are broken by 
recording new information (represented by a coherent condensation of the NG bosons), (a) 
‘NOW you know’ occurs, (b) ‘arrow of time’, a partition in time evolution, and the distinction 
between the past and the future are introduced in brain dynamics, and (c) one moves forward in 
time (25). 
The spatial invariance of the phenomenal time requires assigning a conserved entity over 
space. This space-invariant entity could be long-range spatial correlations, which is wave-like 
collective modes, such as QFT-NG boson modes. They can be generated dynamically, which can 
explain memory (past) (25). They can propagate over whole brain spatiotemporally. They are the 
carriers of the order in terms of long-range (a) spatial correlation for the present phenomenal 
time, (b) temporal correlation for past phenomenal time, and (c) spatiotemporal correlations to 
maintain continuity of Self until disintegration during death. The past in terms of memory could 
also be recoded in microtubule-network (50-53). In soliton-model (8), the emergent of the 
phenomenal time may also include extra-neural interaction of the soliton/traveling-wave 
(generated during neuronal-firing) carrying time-related information with motion or flicker 
related structures, such as motion area V5, for CFF.  
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The duration of synchronization of neural activities of various areas is longer for more 
complex information processing; this duration is called ‘coherence interval’, which is vehicle for 
the moment of our conscious experience (31). Neural synchrony has been considered as one of 
the neural correlates of consciousness (5, 7, 14, 17, 18, 26, 27).  One could define the time needed 
for temporal integration (or coherence interval) as access time, which is variable and may be 
related to access (reportable) awareness.  
 One of the main arguments for ‘dendritic web’ or ‘hyper-neurons’ with gap junction (11) 
being responsible for consciousness hinges on the hypothesis that the axonal-dendritic neuro-
computational feedback networks of the brain fails to explain the correlation of consciousness 
with gamma synchrony. However, it is not clear that the gamma synchrony is the only neural 
correlate of consciousness (NCC).  For subjective experience (SE), essential ingredients are 
wakefulness, attention (for access awareness), re-entry, (working) memory, and proto-
experiences (37, 41). In my view, there are 4 channels for information transfer: (i) Classical 
axonal-dendritic networks, (ii) Quantum dendritic webs with gap junction, (iii) Astro-glia-neuron 
interaction, and (iv) Extra-cellular electromagnetic field (such as generated by spikes).  Their 
contributions to SE are not clear and are debatable. My view is that (i)-(iii) might be involved in 
specific and (iv) in non-specific information transfer. Assigning (i) to autopilot or non-conscious 
processing and (ii) to pilot or consciousness (Hameroff) is debatable.  It may depend on how one 
defines the terms 'consciousness', 'unconscious' and 'non-conscious' because ‘consciousness’ is a 
confusing term as it has different meaning to different people.  It is also useful to distinguish SE 
from the content of SE. 
 
 
7.  Phenomenal space  
 
Space can be addressed by its following aspects: (i) Physical space: Compton wavelength of the 
electron is about 2.43x10-12 meter; proton’s diameter is 1.6 to 1.7×10-125 m. (ii) Perceptual rate for 
space: this is cutoff frequency and is measured in cycles per degree (cpd) using grating and 
psychophysical method. It is about 60 cpd (4). Photoreceptor array in the human visual system 
can resolve in the order of ~150 cpd (20).  Hyper- or Vernier-acuity5 is about 10 arc seconds; see 
also (48, 49). 
The phenomenal space could be defined as reciprocal of perceptual rate for space (i.e., 
1/cutoff spatial frequency) in analogy to phenomenal time, which is consistent with the 
‘psychological space’: there is always an experienced space in which subjective experience does 
not change even though external information could be varying.  
 
 
8. Integration of reductive and non-reductive views 
 
In reductive views, all phenomena can be reduced to the characteristics of elementary particles. 
However, before the introduction of PE-SE framework, elementary particles are considered as 
non-experiential material entities. That is why explanatory gap (how mind can emerge from non-
experiential matter) appeared. In PE-SE framework (37, 41), strings or elementary particles 
(fermions and bosons) are considered to have irreducible fundamental SEs and/or PEs in 
                                                     
5 A normal subject can demonstrate an accuracy of 10 arc seconds and a repeatability of 5 arc seconds in the task 
aligning a pair of fine lines to each other.  
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superimposed form. Therefore, all phenomena including mental entities can be reduced to 
physics, where elementary particles are considered as carriers of SEs/PEs in unexpressed form. 
Since SEs are also consistent with non-reductive views, both reductive and non-reductive views 
can be integrated.  
According to (31), “When the visual system is stimulated, within a few hundreds of 
milliseconds all these neurons become engaged in a pattern of activity. I shall refer to the 
mechanisms that give rise to this pattern as the inner loop […] External factors contribute on a 
huge variety of time scales: evolution, development, socialization, learning, task and both 
indirect […] and instantaneous […] perception/action contingencies. Let us call the totality of all 
these interactions the outer loop […] Perceptual experience can be explained by contextualized 
brain dynamics. An inner loop of ongoing activity within the brain produces dynamic patterns of 
synchronization and de-synchronization that are necessary, but not sufficient, for visual 
experience. This inner loop is controlled by evolution, development, socialization, learning, task 
and perception-action contingencies, which constitute an outer loop. This outer loop is sufficient, 
but not necessary, for visual experience. Jointly, the inner and outer loop may offer sufficient and 
necessary conditions for the emergence of visual experience … The dynamics of chaotic 
itinerancy [for the inner loop] offers patterns of synchrony that appear during the laminar 
periods [the time periods during which a system dwells near a corrupted attractor and shows a 
pattern of synchronized activity that persists for a while, without being stable].”  In PE-SE 
framework (37, 41), both inner and outer loops resonate for the emergence of SEs.   
 
 
9. Integration of implicit (state-approach), explicit (dynamic-approach), 
and contextual emergence views 
 
According to (16) “In the implicit-assumption camp are those who conceptualize consciousness 
via terms such as states and representations (in what follows we will simply refer to this as the 
state approach). This way of conceptualizing consciousness entails implicit assumptions about 
the stability of consciousness because it focuses on conscious phenomena (e.g., memories, 
intentions, qualia and thoughts) that persist long enough to be considered individual conscious 
events entailing both content (i.e., the phenomenal ‘feel’ of a memory, intention or thought — see 
Bailey’s contribution) and causal efficacy (i.e., the ability of memories, intentions and thoughts to 
make things happen in one’s cognitive architecture) … In contrast to the implicit-assumption 
camp, those in the explicit assumption camp approach the issue of conscious stability directly. 
That is, their research focuses on the temporal dynamics by which conscious phenomena such as 
memories, intentions and thoughts come to be stable. … Given that state and dynamics theorists 
disagree as to where to look for consciousness, it is not clear to what extent the two can be 
integrated … One might, for example, utilize the notion of ontological relativity mentioned in 
Atmanspacher’s contribution [(2)]. According to this framework, one makes ontological 
assumptions about phenomena at a lower level of scale (i.e., one assumes the phenomena at that 
level truly exist as described by science), so that one can use the entities at that level to make 
epistemological statements (i.e., statements based on observation) about phenomena at a higher 
level. For example, one might make ontological assumptions about chemistry in order to make 
epistemological statements about biology. A similar distinction is played out in Anderson’s 
contribution [(1)] which distinguishes between realist approaches that make claims about what is 
metaphysically real and antirealist approaches that make claims that are relativized to a 
particular epistemic perspective … To be sure, there are many other possible combinations of 
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varieties of realism and beliefs about science and reality. The point here is not to advocate one, 
but to simply make the case that the differences between state and dynamics theorists are not 
necessarily problematic. One can, for example, make ontological assumptions about the 
dynamics approach (i.e., believe that consciousness ultimately is a temporally-grounded multi-
scale phenomenon) while simultaneously being epistemic about the state approach (i.e., 
statements about ‘what consciousness is’ are restricted, when speaking scientifically, to 
epistemologically accessible phenomena that can be measured). Being aware of one’s ontological 
assumptions in this manner might help to stave off arguments about a science of consciousness 
that emerge from one’s simultaneous belief in various forms of realism. If this approach were to 
take hold, an integrated science of consciousness might ultimately come to be in which 
participants achieve an increased awareness of how their scientific assumptions play out in the 
varieties of realism.”  
Jordan and Ghin propose (proto-)consciousness as a contextually emergent property of self-
sustaining systems (15). The concept of contextual emergence is ‘a non-reductive, yet well-
defined relation between different levels of description of physical and other systems’, such as 
‘the relation between neurobiological and mental levels of description’ (2).  Their framework and 
also all materialistic frameworks, such as (6, 10, 23, 30), are valid only if the PE-SE framework (37) 
is accepted in a complementary way. Otherwise they all fail to address type-1 explanatory gap: 
how subjective experiences (such as redness) can emerge from matter (such as self-sustaining 
cerebral neural-nets). The six views, summarized in (37) have been passionately discussed over 
6000 years since RigVedic period. There are 3 aspects: structure, function, and experience. If PE-
SE framework is ignored then materialistic frameworks can address only structure and function; 
they will never be able to address SEs. There is no way out, but to accept the dual-aspect PE-SE 
framework because this has the least number of problems compared to other views.  
The framework of contextual emergence of higher level features (such as SEs) from lower 
level description of neural signals along with the contingent contextual conditions (2) may 
integrate state and dynamics based models, but explanatory gap remains.  To minimize this 
problem, contextual emergence framework and PE-SE framework (37) can be combined in 
complementary manner.  In PE-SE framework (37, 41), the difference between reduction (higher-
level features can be reduced to lower level) features and emergence (emerged higher-level 
features such as SEs cannot be reduced to lower level) is minimized. This is because the basic 
elements are postulated to have two aspects: (i) they have elemental PEs (all types of SEs/PEs are 
in superimposed form, so elements are non-specific) as mental aspect and (ii) they have material 
aspect such as mass, charge, and spin. These two aspects co-evolve and co-develop so that the 
non-specificity of elements is transformed into the specificity of neural-nets by resonating the 
neural-net PEs with stimulus-PEs (37, 41).  In other words, emerged SEs can be reduced to 
elemental-PEs. 
  In dual-aspect view, the concept ‘causality’ is paired with ‘physical’, but ‘physical’ includes 
PE/SE; so both aspects are causally closed. In materialism, however, ‘physical’ does not include 
PE/SE and hence causality is paired with ‘material’, i.e., material world is causally closed and 
PE/SE is mere epiphenomenon.  
 Furthermore, Theory of Everything (TOE) must address consciousness, i. e., the 
unification/integration of SE/consciousness with string theory might be useful, in my view. In 
this way the term ‘physicalism’ is broadened to include PE/SE, whereas the term ‘materialism’ 
can still be used the way it always has been, i.e., physicalism = materialism + PE/SE. 
 
 
N
at
ur
e 
Pr
ec
ed
in
gs
 : 
hd
l:1
01
01
/n
pr
e.
20
08
.2
27
2.
1 
: P
os
te
d 
8 
Se
p 
20
08
Subjective Experiences of Space and Time    
                                                                                      RLP Vimal 
 8 
10. Conclusion 
 
The three non-experiential materialistic models: (quantum-dissipation model (25), soliton-
catalytic model (8), and ‘sensation from evolution of action’ model (13) can address to some 
extent the function of structures, such as perception.  They cannot address the explanatory gap 
(how mind can emerge from non-experiential matter). The complementary experiential PE-SE 
framework (37, 41) addresses this psycho-physical gap and elucidates the SEs of space and time. 
Various views can now be integrated. 
 
 
 
Acknowledgments 
The work was partly supported by VP-Research Foundation Trust, Vision Research Institute, and Dristi 
Anusandhana Sansthana research Funds.  Author would like to thank anonymous reviewers, Ronald J. MacGregor, 
R. R. Poznanski, Manju-Uma C. Pandey-Vimal, Vivekanand Pandey Vimal, Shalini Pandey Vimal, and Love 
(Shyam) Pandey Vimal for their critical comments, suggestions, and grammatical corrections.  Other related articles 
are (3, 19, 32-37, 39-44).   
 
 
 
Competing interests statement 
The author declares that he has no competing financial interests.  
 
 
 
References 
 
1. Anderson DL. Consciousness and Realism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14, 2007. 
2. Atmanspacher H. Contextual Emergence from Physics to Cognitive Neuroscience. Journal of 
Consciousness Studies 14: 18–36, 2007. 
3. Bruzzo AA and Vimal RLP. Self: An adaptive pressure arising from self-organization, chaotic 
dynamics, and neural Darwinism. Journal of Integrative Neuroscience 6: 541-566, 2007. 
4. Campbell FW and Green DG. Optical and retinal factors affecting visual resolution. J Physiol 181: 576-
593, 1965. 
5. Chalmers DJ. On the search for the neural correlates of consciousness. In: Toward a science of 
consciousness II, edited by Hameroff S, Kaszniak A and Scott A. Cambrigde, MA: MIT Press, 1998. 
6. Crick F and Clark J. The Astonishing Hypothesis. Journal of Consciousness Studies 1, 1994. 
7. Crick F and Koch C. Towards a neurobiological theory of consciousness. Seminars in the Neurosciences 
2: 263-275, 1990. 
8. Davia CJ. Life, Catalysis and Excitable Media: A Dynamic Systems Approach to Metabolism and 
Cognition. In: The Emerging Physics of Consciousness, edited by Tuszynski J. Heidelberg, Germany: Springer-
Verlag, 2006, p. 229-260. 
N
at
ur
e 
Pr
ec
ed
in
gs
 : 
hd
l:1
01
01
/n
pr
e.
20
08
.2
27
2.
1 
: P
os
te
d 
8 
Se
p 
20
08
Subjective Experiences of Space and Time    
                                                                                      RLP Vimal 
 9 
9. Del Guidice E, Doglia S, Milani M, and Vitiello G. Coherence of electromagnetic radiation in 
biological systems. Cell Biophys 13: 221-224, 1988. 
10. Edelman GM. Neural Darwinism: The Theory of Group Neuronal Selection. Oxford.: Oxford University 
Press, 1989. 
11. Hameroff S, Nip A, Porter M, and Tuszynski J. Conduction pathways in microtubules, biological 
quantum computation, and consciousness. Biosystems 64: 149-168, 2002. 
12. Humphrey N. A History of the Mind. London: Chatto & Windus, 1992. 
13. Humphrey N. The privatization of sensation. In: The Evolution of Cognition, edited by Huber L and 
Heyes C. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press, 2000, p. 241-252. 
14. John ER. A Field Theory of Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 10: 184–213, 2001. 
15. Jordan JS and Ghin M. (Proto-) Consciousness as a Contextually Emergent Property of Self-Sustaining 
Systems. Mind & Matter 4: 45–68, 2006. 
16. Jordan JS and McBride DM. Concepts of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14: viii–xii, 
2007. 
17. Llinas RR, Ribary U, Joliot M, and Wang X-J. Content and context in temporal thalamocortical 
binding. In: Temporal Coding in the Brain, edited by Buzsaki G, Llinas RR and Singer W. Berlin: Springer 
Verlag., 1994. 
18. Lutz A, Lachaux JP, Martinerie J, and Varela FJ. Guiding the study of brain dynamics by using first-
person data: synchrony patterns correlate with ongoing conscious states during a simple visual task. Proc 
Natl Acad Sci U S A 99: 1586-1591, 2002. 
19. MacGregor RJ and Vimal RLP. Consciousness and the Structure of Matter. Journal of Integrative 
Neuroscience 7: 75-116., 2008. 
20. Miller DT, Williams DR, Morris GM, and Liang J. Images of cone photoreceptors in the living human 
eye. Vision Res 36: 1067-1079, 1996. 
21. Northoff G and Bermpohl F. Cortical midline structures and the self. Trends Cogn Sci 8: 102-107, 2004. 
22. Northoff G, Heinzel A, de Greck M, Bermpohl F, Dobrowolny H, and Panksepp J. Self-referential 
processing in our brain--a meta-analysis of imaging studies on the self. Neuroimage 31: 440-457, 2006. 
23. O’Regan JK and Noë A. A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness. Behav Brain Sci 24: 
939-973; discussion 973-1031, 2001. 
24. Pessa E and Vitiello G. Quantum dissipation and neural net dynamics. Bioelectrochem Bioenerg 48: 339-
342, 1999. 
25. Pessa E and Vitiello G. Quantum noise, entanglement and chaos in the quantum field theory of 
mind/brain states. Mind and Matter 1: 59-79, 2003. 
26. Quinlan PT. Visual feature integration theory: past, present, and future. Psychol Bull 129: 643-673, 2003. 
N
at
ur
e 
Pr
ec
ed
in
gs
 : 
hd
l:1
01
01
/n
pr
e.
20
08
.2
27
2.
1 
: P
os
te
d 
8 
Se
p 
20
08
Subjective Experiences of Space and Time    
                                                                                      RLP Vimal 
 10 
27. Singer W and Gray CM. Visual feature integration and the temporal correlation hypothesis. Annu Rev 
Neurosci 18: 555-586, 1995. 
28. Stroud JM. The fine structure of psychological time. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 138: 623, 
1967. 
29. Stuart CIJ, Takahashi Y, and Umezawa H. On the stability and non-local properties of memory. 
Journal of Theoretical Biology 71: 605–618, 1978. 
30. Thompson E and Varela FJ. Radical embodiment: neural dynamics and consciousness. Trends Cogn Sci 
5: 418-425, 2001. 
31. van Leeuwen C. What Needs To Emerge To Make You Conscious? Journal of Consciousness Studies 14: 
115–136, 2007. 
32. Vimal RLP. Attention and Emotion. The Annual Review of Biomedical Sciences (ARBS) 10: 84-104. 
Available: http://arbs.biblioteca.unesp.br/viewissue.php, 2008. 
33. Vimal RLP. Definition of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies: Re-submitted on 20 August 
2008, 2008. 
34. Vimal RLP. Proto-experiences and Subjective Experiences. Quantum Mind 2007, edited by Berrnroider 
G and Hameroff S, The University of Salzburg, Salzburg, Austria. Consciousness Research Abstracts: a 
service from the Journal of consciousness Studies; pages 110-111 (abstract number 111); see also 
<http://www.sbg.ac.at/brain2007/ >: P31 (July 17): <http://www.geocities.com/vri98/PE-SE-QMind-
2007-Vimal.pdf>.  Manuscript available: http://www.geocities.com/rlpvimal/PE-SE-Vimal-Short-AR-
PE.pdf, 2007. 
35. Vimal RLP. Proto-Experiences and Subjective Experiences I: Integration of Classical, Quantum, and 
Subquantum Concepts. NeuroQuantology: Submitted for publication on 5 August 2008, 200x. 
36. Vimal RLP. Proto-Experiences and Subjective Experiences II: Integration of Classical and Quantum 
Concepts for Emergence Hypothesis. NeuroQuantology: Submitted for publication on 5 August 2008, 200x. 
37. Vimal RLP. Proto-experiences and Subjective Experiences: Classical and Quantum Concepts. Journal of 
Integrative Neuroscience 7: 49-73, 2008. 
38. Vimal RLP. Proto-Experiences and Subjective Experiences: Integration of Classical, Quantum, and 
Subquantum Concepts. In review: Available: http://www.geocities.com/rlpvimal/Vimal-PE-SE-
subquantum-integration.pdf and as TA104 at www.kjf.ca, 2008. 
39. Vimal RLP. Selection of a Specific Subjective Experience: Matching of Superposed Subjective 
Experiences in Internal Neural-Nets with That in External Sensory Input. Journal of Integrative Neuroscience: 
Submitted on 24-July-2008, 2008. 
40. Vimal RLP. Towards a Theory of Everything: Unification of Consciousness with Fundamental Forces 
in String Theory. Journal of Integrative Neuroscience: Submitted on 21-August-2008, 2008. 
41. Vimal RLP. Visual Awareness: Integration of Psychophysical, Neurophysiological, and Consciousness 
Research for Red-Green Channel. In review, Journal of Integrative Neuroscience: Re-submitted on 28 August 
2008. Available at http://www.geocities.com/rlpvimal/Visual-Awareness-Vimal.pdf, 2008. 
N
at
ur
e 
Pr
ec
ed
in
gs
 : 
hd
l:1
01
01
/n
pr
e.
20
08
.2
27
2.
1 
: P
os
te
d 
8 
Se
p 
20
08
Subjective Experiences of Space and Time    
                                                                                      RLP Vimal 
 11 
42. Vimal RLP and Davia CJ. How Long is a Piece of Time? - Phenomenal Time and Quantum Coherence 
- Toward a Solution. Quantum Biosystems 2: 102-151. Available at 
http://www.quantumbionet.org/admin/files/QBS102%20102-20151.pdf, 2008. 
43. Vimal RLP and Pandey-Vimal M-UC. Ancient Historical Scripture and Color Vision. Color Research 
and Application 32: 332-333., 2007. 
44. Vimal RLP, Pandey-Vimal M-UC, Vimal L-SP, Stopa EG, Renshaw PF, and Harper DG. Activation 
of Suprachiasmatic Nuclei and Primary Visual Cortex Depends upon Time of Day. In review, European 
Journal of Neuroscience: Re-submitted on 20-August-2008; available: 
http://www.geocities.com/rlpvimal/SCN-Vimal-et-al.pdf, 2008. 
45. Vitiello G. Dissipation and memory capacity in the quantum brain model. International Journal of 
Modern Physics B9: 973–989, 1995. 
46. Vitiello G. Dissipative quantum brain dynamics. In: No Matter, Never Mind, edited by Yasue K, Jibu M 
and Della T. Amsterdam: Senta, Benjamins, 2002, p. 43-61. 
47. Vitiello G. My double unveiled: The dissipative quantum model of the brain. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: 
John Benjamins, 2001. 
48. Waugh SJ and Levi DM. Spatial alignment across gaps: contributions of orientation and spatial scale. J 
Opt Soc Am A Opt Image Sci Vis 12: 2305-2317, 1995. 
49. Waugh SJ, Levi DM, and Carney T. Orientation, masking, and vernier acuity for line targets. Vision 
Res 33: 1619-1638, 1993. 
50. Woolf N. Microtubules in Consciousness and Cognition: Could Transport of Receptors and mRNA be 
Involved? Journal of Consciousness Studies 11, 2004. 
51. Woolf NJ. A structural basis for memory storage in mammals. Prog Neurobiol 55: 59-77, 1998. 
52. Woolf NJ and Hameroff SR. A quantum approach to visual consciousness. TRENDS in Cognitive 
Sciences 5: 472-478, 2001. 
53. Woolf NJ, Zinnerman MD, and Johnson GV. Hippocampal microtubule-associated protein-2 
alterations with contextual memory. Brain Res 821: 241-249, 1999. 
 
 
N
at
ur
e 
Pr
ec
ed
in
gs
 : 
hd
l:1
01
01
/n
pr
e.
20
08
.2
27
2.
1 
: P
os
te
d 
8 
Se
p 
20
08
